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[*1107]   
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer urges the student of federal administrative law to develop an 
understanding of “the basic principles applied by the courts in reviewing agency decisions.” n1 Among these basic 
principles, Breyer lists the doctrine of ripeness, which can “determine when or whether [litigants] can ask a court to 
review agency action.” n2 The basic idea of ripeness asks whether the matter before the court is filed at the right time, 
but the ripeness doctrine is anything but simple. The doctrine suffers from a murkiness n3 making it “difficult to 
distinguish” n4 from other closely-related doctrines governing the scope of judicial review. n5 This Comment 
introduces the ripeness doctrine, analyzes the doctrine’s relationship to related doctrines, and criticizes application of 
the doctrine by courts sensitive to “dilemmas” faced by regulated entities when judicial review is sought prior to agency 
enforcement or implementation action. n6 
[*1108]  Part I introduces the ripeness doctrine and discusses the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the 
doctrine. Part II examines the relationship between the ripeness doctrine, the Administrative Procedure Act, other 
federal statutes, and the U.S. Constitution. Part III examines recent Supreme Court articulations of the doctrine. Part IV 
showcases the basic rationale behind ripeness. Part V explores the relationship between the ripeness doctrine and the 
doctrine of standing. This Part shows how ripeness is both constitutional and prudential in nature. n7 Part VI observes 
the interplay between elements of the ripeness doctrine and underscores the strategic importance of characterization of 
the facts. Part VII describes the dilemma of the regulated entity forced to decide whether or not to risk prosecution by 
violating a provision of questionable validity. This is followed by a brief excursion into the pre-history of the ripeness 
doctrine. The Comment proposes no new, bright-line rule, advances no magic formula of universal application, and 
offers no complete coverage of ripeness cases. n8 The Comment simply attempts a description of an unevenly applied 
doctrine with emphasis on decisions of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and offers a few items of advice for 
practitioners. 
I 
The Ripeness Test 
The seminal Supreme Court case addressing ripeness is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner. n9 The ripeness test laid 
down in Abbott Laboratories asks courts to “evaluate the fitness of the issues for judicial decision n10 and the hardship 
to the parties of withholding court consideration.” n11 Judicial review can be established, definitively, by the 
challenger, but the ripeness doctrine presents a separate hurdle that can shut off access to judicial review. It is the non-
discretionary duty of federal courts to place the ripeness hurdle in the path of any challenger. n12 Like that of judicial 
review  [*1109]  itself, n13 the scope of this other hurdle has proven to be variable. 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration issued a regulation requiring 
prescription drug manufacturers to print generic names on labels every time the trade name of a drug was printed on the 
bottle. n14 This regulation was the product of an agency’s enforcement powers under the efficient enforcement 
provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). n15 An amendment to the FDCA required the generic 
name of a prescription drug to be printed below the brand name, to help consumers reduce health expenditures by more 
easily identifying the generic, and less expensive, equivalents. The drug companies charged that the “every time” 
2 
provision would impose massive printing costs and was an excessively harsh regulatory imposition. n16 The 
Commissioner had not suspended any drug registrations for violation of this new labeling requirement before the 
companies filed suit. The challenge was not based upon actual damage incurred, but rather the fear that the companies 
would be placed in the unfortunate dilemma of having to risk suspension in order to challenge the regulations. n17 The 
Court’s new ripeness test asked whether the issues in the case were fit for judicial resolution and whether any party 
would suffer undue hardship in the absence of judicial resolution. 
1. Fitness 
The first prong of the ripeness doctrine tests whether the issues are “fit” for judicial consideration. For issues raised 
in the controversy to be fit for resolution by the court, they should be largely legal in nature and should not require 
further factual development. In Abbott Laboratories, both parties agreed that the issues were “purely legal” in nature. 
n18 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a balancing  [*1110]  approach to the issue of fitness and will 
hesitate to vacate any lower court decision adverse to an agency when it recognizes that an agency has neither fully 
explained its position nor has had an adequate opportunity to do so. n19 Practitioners should emphasize the 
completeness of any of the factual components in either the record or the briefs (where statutory judicial review 
provisions bring the parties before an appellate court). 
Fitness is also measured by the finality of the disputed action or omission. For an agency, final action “must mark 
the ‘consummation’ of [its] decisionmaking process,” and not be “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” n20 
Given the tendency of modern bureaucracies (the “fourth branch” of government n21) to make decisions in a fluid, 
ongoing manner, the question here is: did the agency reach the last step in its thought process in the matter before the 
court? To be final, the action “must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow.’“ n22 
Examples of final agency action are publication of a regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations or issuance of an 
order denying immigration to an alien applicant. The D.C. Circuit is clear about which indicia it will look to when 
making the finality determination. n23 An agency cannot “expect to escape judicial review by hiding behind a finality 
clause.” n24 When the challenger’s lone obstacle to establishing ripeness is a boilerplate disclaimer by an agency 
defendant that its action is not to be interpreted as being a final agency action for the purposes of judicial review, the 
challenger will prevail. 
Courts are concerned with constraining the ambit of legal analysis to a set of manageable, legal issues that call on 
the normal talents and training of the judicial branch. In a recent D.C. Circuit  [*1111]  case, Clean Air Implementation 
Project v. EPA, n25 where the plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s new “credible evidence” rule, the court was asked to 
hypothesize what might be the most likely effects of the rule’s application. Recognizing the speculative nature of the 
request, the court stated that “judicial resolution of these issues would benefit significantly from having ‘the scope of 
the controversy ... reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete 
action applying the regulation to the [petitioners’] situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm’ them.” n26 The 
court usually asks: would consideration of the issue benefit from a more concrete setting? n27 Judges enjoy a wide 
degree of discretion in determining an appropriate level of concreteness. 
2. Hardship 
The second prong of the ripeness test measures whether the challenger would bear significant hardship if judicial 
review is postponed. This inquiry focuses not on the ultimate injury claimed (such as the long-term effect of a 
regulation) but rather on any additional burden imposed by having to wait for the exercise of agency enforcement action 
before raising a challenge to the rules or regulations underlying the action. The D.C. Circuit is “unwilling to disrupt this 
administrative process when ‘no irremediable adverse consequences flow from requiring a later challenge to [a] 
regulation.’“ n28 But when do adverse consequences become irremediable? 
Abbott Laboratories provides an answer that seems at first blush to resolve the issue. Upon further examination, 
however, the answer raises more questions than it resolves. When the impact of the challenged action results in 
“sufficiently direct and immediate” consequences to the challenging party, the hardship test is met. n29 If the 
challenged action requires an “immediate and significant change in the plaintiff’s conduct of their affairs with serious 
penalties attached to noncompliance,” n30 the court will recognize a hardship. 
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Mere financial loss does not qualify as a hardship under this  [*1112]  approach. “Financial loss is not by itself a 
sufficient interest.” n31 The harm to the pharmaceutical corporations in Abbott Laboratories went beyond financial loss 
and included the labor involved in redesigning and reprinting labels. Hardship can also be shown where the challenger 
alleges it is “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” n32 Hardship 
endured by the agency faced with pre-enforcement litigation is also taken into account. n33 
Normally both fitness and hardship are necessary before a case is considered to be ripe. Laurence Tribe posits that 
“either or both” are necessary. n34 But Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest that both must be met prior to a 
finding of ripeness. n35 Erwin Chemerinsky reminds us that “it is unclear whether a greater hardship might compensate 
for less in the way of factual record or vice versa.” n36 
II 
Ripeness Under the APA, Statutes, and the U.S. Constitution 
Before 1967 the norm in administrative law was that agency action could not be challenged until policies were 
implemented or the challenging party became the subject of an enforcement action. This was no hard and fast rule. 
Rather it was a “prevailing opinion” that was effective in discouraging pre-enforcement litigation. n37 Abbott 
Laboratories changed the norm and opened the floodgates to pre-enforcement challenges. 
Abbott Laboratories and its companion case, Toilet Goods  [*1113]  Ass’n v. Gardner, n38 signaled a new 
willingness to entertain early challenges and reaffirmed the presumption of reviewability under the APA. New 
regulatory statutes helped strengthen this understanding by explicitly providing for pre-enforcement judicial review. n39 
Certain principles of constitutional law also permit courts to find issues even more ripe for judicial consideration. 
A. Finality under the APA 
The fitness of the issues for judicial consideration is measured by whether the issues are primarily legal in nature 
and also by whether the challenged action is final action. Whether an action is considered “final” under the APA is 
governed by 5 U.S.C. 704. n40 The concept of finality in this section means that, for agency actions, “unless an agency 
provides by regulation for a stay of challenged actions pending administrative appeal, the actions will be considered 
‘final’ and subject to judicial review, if the actions otherwise meet the requirements for judicial review under the APA.” 
n41 The presence of finality reduces the importance of whether the issues are purely legal. 
Some commentators argue that the APA removes the finality element from the ripeness test. Certainly, the timing 
of the harm is crucial. Congress has affirmed this in the APA. “When agency decisions have an immediate effect, they 
likely are ‘ripe’ for judicial review.” n42 The ripeness doctrine has been viewed as an undesirable means of going 
beyond the APA. “The APA does not authorize balancing; it is a one-prong, not a two-prong, test.” n43 But this 
argument is strictly textualist and ignores the prudential nature of ripeness. Patricia Wald, a former D.C. Circuit judge, 
notes that “textualism has not taken as big a hold on the D.C. Circuit as on the Supreme Court.” n44 However, the APA 
has been interpreted to presumptively allow judicial review of  [*1114]  final action, n45 leading judges to use the 
ripeness doctrine to rule on issues of hardship. 
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to impose its own views upon a scheme “through which Congress enacted ‘a 
formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.’“ n46 The courts might also still be wary of 
New Deal criticisms of insufficient judicial deference to statutory, majoritarian mandates. n47 The APA was enacted in 
1946, a decade after the first New Deal legislation, and immediately after the wrenching experience of World War II. 
Article III judges might believe this historical context increases the comparative strength of the APA over the ripeness 
doctrine. 
B. Ripeness and Other Statutory Pre-Enforcement Review Provisions 
Subsequent to Abbott Laboratories, Congress has adopted so many regulatory statutes providing for judicial review 
prior to enforcement and implementation of regulations that pre-enforcement review has become the norm. n48 Statutes 
of limitation also encourage litigants and agencies to resolve their differences at the beginning of a regulation’s lifetime 
to promote consistency and predictability. Generally, the government must show, by a clear and convincing standard of 
proof, the existence of a congressional intent to restrict pre-enforcement review. n49 Otherwise the presumption is that 
pre-enforcement review was intended. 
Congress actually encourages the development of the ripeness doctrine in the courts. Like federal administrative 
common law itself, ripeness allows life-tenured judges to mull over complex problems fraught with political 
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consequences. This lets “overworked federal legislators ... transfer a part of their load to federal  [*1115]  judges.” n50 
This may help explain the growth of such provisions. Further rationales for pre-enforcement review are discussed in 
Part IV. 
C. Ripeness and the U.S. Constitution 
Connections between ripeness and the U.S. Constitution include the link between the hardship of denying pre-
enforcement review and Article III’s case or controversy requirement. These connections are discussed in Part V. The 
Court often dispenses with the hardship prong in certain constitutional cases, like those involving fundamental rights. 
But the existence of a constitutional issue can also work to a litigant’s disadvantage when the Court wishes to avoid 
ruling on the merits. 
In one case, plaintiffs’ challenge was ripe for review, even though they did not have to prove harm when alleging a 
pattern or practice of constitutional harm. African Americans sought injunctive relief against illegal searches of their 
homes by the Baltimore City Police Department in violation of their rights to privacy. Sometimes courts will find this 
kind of injury too speculative to be ripe for review. In this case, however, the “sense of impending crisis in police - 
community relations” motivated a finding that the case was ripe for review. n51 
First Amendment cases illustrate the different treatment of ripeness when issues of constitutionality predominate. In 
First Amendment cases, the Court “has enunciated other concerns that justify a lessening of the usual prudential” 
requirements for a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute with criminal penalties. n52 The hardship of denying pre-
enforcement review of challenged restrictions on First Amendment freedoms takes the form of a “chilling effect” on 
these freedoms, which are “of transcendent value to all society.” n53 The Court is, of course, reluctant to  [*1116]  find 
a case ripe for consideration when the constitutional issues underlying the case could be characterized as moot. n54 
There is a strong interconnection between ripeness and constitutional issues. At least one commentator feels that 
this relationship has created current confusion with the doctrine. n55 The Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional issues, revisited ripeness several times since 1967. 
III 
U.S. Supreme Court Ripeness Articulations 
The Supreme Court enjoys great discretion in determining “what is a sufficient likelihood of hardship.” n56 In 
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, n57 illegal aliens seeking amnesty faced the same dilemma of pre-enforcement 
hardship faced by pharmaceutical companies in Abbott Laboratories. n58 The aliens challenged an INS regulation 
requiring them to show that they had resided without interruption in the United States for a period of time before they 
could apply for permanent resident status. The risk of immediate deportation associated with applying for this 
temporary residence permit was great for those who had been away from the United States for a short time during the 
period specified in the regulation. Interpreting the conferral of nationality as a benefit rather than a right, the Court 
denied the aliens’ challenge as unripe for judicial consideration, reasoning that since residency was a benefit, not a right, 
deprivation of residency did not constitute hardship for purposes of ripeness. Justices O’Connor and Stevens disagreed 
that categorical bifurcation of rights and benefits could govern the “hardship” determination in a ripeness analysis. n59 
Citizens enjoy a right to clean air as a fundamental right emanating  [*1117]  from the penumbras of the First 
Amendment right to life. Courts, such as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, continue to treat this as a benefit to be 
enjoyed rather than a right to be protected, despite clear and convincing congressional intent to protect the air under the 
Clean Air Act and its amendments. n60 All this seems to say that if the alleged hardship of denial of pre-enforcement 
review is too speculative, then the case will fail on ripeness grounds. n61 
The most recent focused review of the Abbott Laboratories ripeness doctrine involved a suit by environmentalists 
challenging a National Forest Management Plan (NFMP). n62 In Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club, a 
unanimous Court took pains to reexamine the ripeness doctrine and advertise to the district courts its disappointment 
with the generally cursory ripeness analyses of lower courts. n63 
The Ohio Forestry Court, however, seems to have kept the Abbott Laboratories formula intact. The case did “not 
seem to mark a major turning point in ripeness doctrine.” n64 The Court may have missed an opportunity to recognize 
the special injuries specifically caused by early decisions in forest planning, but the Court does allow for exceptions by 
which such injury could be shown. n65 The decision clarified a split among the circuit courts concerning the ripeness of 
NFMP challenges. n66 
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The Supreme Court prefers a more cautious approach to interpretation of constitutional provisions, taking note of 
its own restricted competence in the fact-finding and the policy-making. n67  [*1118]  The design of the Court simply 
does not include the tools necessary for conducting a thorough discovery process or crafting a majoritarian consensus in 
complex policy-making decisions. n68 Thus it is interesting, in certain cases, to witness the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals behaving comfortably with limited facts and taking pains to construct policy. n69 When limited by the absence 
of enforcement action and the context-specific facts generated therefrom, the courts tend to shy away from a 
determination of ripeness. 
IV 
Policy Rationale: What Does Ripeness Accomplish? 
The basic purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to protect both agencies and courts from inappropriate interference. 
n70 While interference is a straight-forward notion, appropriateness is a notoriously slippery one. Justice Harlan’s oft-
quoted rationale for ripeness in Abbott Laboratories is “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the 
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete 
way by the challenging parties.” n71 Abstract disagreements are theoretical debates stripped of sufficient  [*1119]  facts 
specific to the parties. n72 
Questions presented must be worked out “not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete 
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” n73 The chances of 
satisfying the purposes of the ripeness doctrine increase when the interests for which protection is sought are already 
viewed as legally protected. Such interests are “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.” n74 
Ripeness is an evaluation of the timeliness n75 of allowing discrete litigation to break the largely unbroken 
continuum of agency life. It also serves to protect the interests of litigants and the court itself. 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Court agreed that a pre-enforcement resolution of issues surrounding a newly 
announced policy or regulation would be a win-win situation “calculated to speed enforcement,” Justice Abe Fortes 
reasoning that “if the Government prevails, a large part of the industry is bound by the decree; if the Government loses, 
it can more quickly revise its regulation.” n76 Regulated entities want to be able to plan for and predict how regulations 
will be enforced, and agencies want to resolve legal challenges early in the life of the regulated program. n77 If early 
challenges are held to be ripe for judicial consideration,  [*1120]  agencies will have a chance to “function - to iron out 
differences, to accommodate special problems, [and] to grant exemptions” prior to intervention by a court. n78 Post-
enforcement challenges have their own advantages. 
Regulated entities generally can violate the standards that apply to their particular activity or industry and escape 
the full brunt of punishment permissible by statute or regulation. This is referred to as “slippage management” - 
understanding and exploiting the difference between regulatory standards as they appear on paper and the actual 
behavior of the regulated parties. n79 The “dilemma,” discussed in Part VIII, faced by the regulated entity is not quite 
the behemoth described by industry counsel. 
Enforcement is the crucible for shaping good law. “We think by example and analogy, and we are prompted to act 
by concrete problems involving specific persons and circumstances.” n80 Concreteness of injury is measured by how it 
plays out in the process of enforcement action. n81 Reviewing the experience of the National Highway Transportation 
Safety Administration, some commentators feel that early review tends to “overburden rulemaking by ‘front-loading’ an 
adversary overlay to the development of agency policy and introducing undue delay, impeding timely and effective 
highway safety regulation.” n82 Quashing the possibility of continuing negotiations with regulated entities “in light of 
practical experience with implementation” discourages compromise and promotes “abstract court litigation over 
requirements that have never been implemented.” n83 
The growth of administrative agencies, especially in the area of adjudication n84 has substantial consequences for 
private rights and has been “dramatic.” n85 “The decisions of administrative tribunals [have been] accorded 
considerable finality, and especially  [*1121]  with respect to fact finding.” n86 Thus the need grew for doctrinal 
guidence as the number and complexity of challenges grew. The Abbott Laboratories test emerged as a mechanism to 
balance all interests with stakes in the controversy. Justice Harlan assured the government that it need not worry about 
multiple lawsuits over the same issue, since the venue transfer provision in 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) allows for lawsuit 
consolidation. n87 “Its open inquiry avoids both the rigidity or prior ripeness law and the questionable systems of 
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classification that characterize other justiciability doctrines.” n88 Despite its clear utility, ripeness lacks an equally clear 
basis for initial justification as a legitimate vehicle of jurisprudence. 
Ripeness has roots in both prudential and constitutional considerations, the latter centering on the Case or 
Controversy Clause of Article III. The hardship prong is said to be constitutional, while the focus on the quality of the 
trial record is seen as prudential. n89 But Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues” such as ripeness are “deployed as a 
matter of wise judging or constitutional politics, rather than as a matter of constitutional principle.” n90 Irrespective of 
the relative importance assigned to each foundational justification, the doctrine of ripeness is inextricably linked with 
that of standing to sue. n91 
V 
Standing Doctrine and Article III Cases and Controversies 
Standing asks whether the parties initiating the litigation are the right ones to bring suit. By contrast, ripeness asks 
whether the time is right for review. n92 Standing, however, determines the proper party in part by inquiring into the 
timeliness of an alleged injury. Ripeness can prevent a plaintiff who fails to adequately brief the timeliness issue from 
litigating any issue. 
[*1122]  Shifting trends in jurisprudence follow similar shifts in the popularity of the standing doctrine. Justice 
Breyer asks, “is the issue of irreparable injury distinct from the issue of ripeness?” n93 This inquiry is a reflection of the 
judicial self-governance “compelled by Article III.” n94 “Few courts draw meaningful distinctions between the two 
doctrines; hence, this aspect of justiciability is one of the most confused areas of the law.” n95 Standing and ripeness 
share a common concern for making certain that the parties’ arguments are fleshed out and enriched by actual 
controversy. 
The requirement of an “adversarial, noncollusive dispute - overlaps with the [doctrines’] requirements to ensure 
that a controversy [exists and is] in need of judicial resolution.” n96 The higher the stakes, the better the quality of the 
presentation of the issues. To this end, the plaintiff needs a “personal stake in the outcome.” n97 This personal stake 
was initially conceived of as being confined to only those injuries that were both imminent and concrete. Cases such as 
Los Angeles v. Lyons n98 confirmed this. Sierra Club v. Morton clarified that certain aesthetic injuries also invest 
parties with standing to sue. n99 But notional similarities complicate the application and understanding of standing and 
ripeness. n100 
The nature of the injury to the plaintiff is the touchstone for determining standing. In Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized the importance of an actual injury or substantially likely future concrete 
injury, calling this requirement an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” n101 Or, the injury  [*1123]  could be seen as 
“informational,” hurting the plaintiff who has been denied access to crucial information. n102 In FEC v. Akins, Justice 
Breyer recognized an injury-in-fact in situations involving the “inability to obtain information” such as lists of donors 
who failed to disclose under federal requirements. n103 The Court found “no reason to doubt their claim that the 
information would help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public offices, 
especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC’s financial assistance 
might play in a specific election.” n104 Or the injury could be expressive and serve to reinforce attitudes, leading to 
harm. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Bush v. Vera n105 recognizes that standing arises when an injury “results from the 
idea or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences 
the action brings about.” n106 In this manner, the expressive harm is similar to the chilling effect of certain government 
restrictions on freedom of expression. 
Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to actual disputes permits courts to entertain only those “cases and 
controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” n107 But the true concern is 
that “the Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party.” 
n108 So what is going on here? “With these flexible standards as benchmarks, the judiciary in almost two hundred 
years’ worth of opportunities ‘has yet to outline successfully the parameters of a constitutional case.’“ n109 
[*1124]  For injuries that have yet to occur, one commonly raised concern is that judicial remedies might amount to 
simple advisory opinions. It is clear that “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that 
the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.” n110 This concern leads judges to avoid issuing rulings in cases 
where the potential for injury is negligible, and functions as a brake on determinations of ripeness. 
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When interpreting the legal issues posed by statutes, facts are less important. Judge Posner says: 
Besides being unavoidably continuous, statutory interpretation normally proceeds without the aid of 
elaborate factual inquiries. When it is an executive or administrative agency that is doing the 
interpreting it brings to the task a greater knowledge of the regulated activity than the judicial or 
legislative branches have, and this knowledge is to some extent a substitute for formal fact-gathering. 
n111 
Characterization of the facts is nonetheless a crucial component of a successful ripeness defense or challenge. 
Finally, the standing doctrine recently underwent remolding by way of several important decisions. In Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, n112 the definition of injury-in-fact, which had been narrowed in 
decisions such as National Wildlife Federation and Steel Co., was broadened. The prohibition against third parties, 
without an original stake in the controversy, bringing suits as the primary parties was somewhat loosened by the 
decision in Stevens. n113 In a qui tam suit authorized by statute, a third party’s interest in obtaining a portion of a 
damage award combines with the public’s interest in adequate enforcement of laws. 
VI 
The Incredible Lightness of Being Ripe: Uneven Application 
There is no touchstone that accurately foresees the outcomes of ripeness determinations. The presentation of issues 
and facts  [*1125]  has much to do with the court’s determination. n114 However, the degree of hardship necessary to 
meet the ripeness test remains incredibly difficult to predict. The courts constantly reevaluate their estimates of the costs 
that can be redressed by judicial review at some later time. n115 
The courts have stealthily begun to tuck away the hardship prong of the traditional ripeness doctrine into the fitness 
prong. The D.C. Circuit, upon finding that a statute expresses a preference for pre-enforcement review, will generally 
not require a showing of hardship, but will be satisfied with an adequate demonstration that the issues are fit for judicial 
resolution. This doctrinal wrinkle runs across the gamut of administrative cases. n116 But hardship can emerge in the 
analysis of the case, showing up in the finality component. Hardship of denial of pre-enforcement review will rarely 
overcome the finality and concreteness requirements, but finality and concreteness will certainly overcome such 
hardship. n117 Or when “‘the issue of harm and the issue on the merits are intertwined,’“ we must assume the 
challenging party’s view of the merits in determining ripeness. n118 
In Abbott Laboratories the injury alleged by the pharmaceutical companies was “sufficiently direct and immediate 
as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review.” n119 A denial of early review might have forced the sensitive 
industry into the position of violating the rule in order to challenge it. The Court saw this as a threat to the public 
interest as it might have reduced public faith in a vital health industry by blackening the companies’ good names with 
criminal sanctions. 
Likewise, in Appalachian Power the alleged hardship of compliance with new EPA pollution monitoring 
requirements was  [*1126]  deemed sufficiently immediate. “Monitoring imposes costs. Petitioners represent that a 
single stack test can ‘cost tens of thousands of dollars, and take a day or more to complete,’ which is why ‘stack testing 
is limited to once or twice a year (at most).’“ n120 If an agency, acting under EPA’s control via its Guidance Document, 
created a permit condition boosting a company’s stack test duty (as set down in a state or federal standard) “from once a 
year to once a month, no one could seriously maintain that this was something other than a substantive change.” n121 
This might not have constituted real hardship in the context of important public health legislation. 
The D.C. Circuit chastised the EPA for promises broken n122 by virtue of significant changes to prior regulatory 
mandates in the Guidance Document, but the court’s dismay is uncalled for. Only the D.C. Circuit follows this logic of 
narrow, textualist interpretation of the APA. n123 Patricia Wald posits that since so many regulatory cases must be 
heard by the courts of this circuit, the large docket or case load contributes to the narrowness as a means of relieving 
some of the stress associated with being unable to adequately consider each case. n124 The steady increase in 
bureaucratic control over social and economic issues, styled “regulatory creep,” has led the D.C. Circuit to use ripeness 
selectively to combat this phenomenon. The decision in Appalachian Power was viewed by court watchers as a huge 
victory for industrial plaintiffs in their efforts to be shake off intrusive agency control. n125 
A sense of jurisprudential confusion is another factor motivating courts to employ discretionary doctrines. n126 For 
instance, the tendency of agencies to avoid the inconvenience and costs associated with formal notice-and-comment 
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procedures by issuing self-styled ‘interpretative’ rules has led the D.C. Circuit to take a close look at the generally 
‘fuzzy’ techniques employed by the  [*1127]  court to differentiate interpretative rules from legislative rules (which 
require notice-and-comment). n127 “Judicial incentives in administrative law favor the development of indeterminate 
standards of review that facilitate an outcome orientation.” n128 This might explain why the ripeness doctrine seems 
rarefied in its application. 
Characterization of the facts remains a crucial predictive factor weighing in favor of the more persuasive and 
creative litigant. Whether parties will prevail with time-based defenses “often depends on how the ‘action’ being 
challenged is characterized.” n129 With Forest Service Management Plans, the government should always seek to 
characterize plaintiff’s challenge as one that applies either to an old plan, for which the defense of laches is available, or 
a challenge to a new plan subject to future decisions by the agency, for which an exhaustion or ripeness defense should 
be used. It is “not uncommon” for both characterizations to be advanced in one action. n130 
Is the ripeness doctrine as fact-specific and flexible as some have described it, n131 and should courts feel free to 
give it the brush-off? Yes and no. However mandatory in nature the ripeness doctrine was at its conception, today it is 
implemented in a discretionary manner. The Ohio Forestry Court does not attempt to cabin this discretion, but does urge 
the lower courts not to completely ignore ripeness analysis in their final written opinions. In other recent D.C. Circuit 
decisions, the warning seems to have gone unheeded. n132 
[*1128]  Ohio Forestry underscores the current Supreme Court’s annoyance with overly cursory or non-existent 
ripeness evaluations by lower courts. Justice Breyer’s opinion took issue with the lower court’s cursory ripeness 
analysis. n133 Challenges to final agency action should undergo careful ripeness analysis, for instance, in actions under 
section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act. n134 The Appalachian Power opinion brushed right past Respondent’s ripeness 
argument, consigning it to a footnote. n135 Similar treatment was afforded Respondent’s ripeness defense in American 
Trucking Ass’n v. EPA. n136 In American Trucking, the court summarily dismissed the argument of finality for 
purposes of satisfying the fitness prong of the ripeness test. n137 Increased lower court attention to ripeness in formal 
opinions should create additional opportunities for litigants to advance their interpretations. 
In the pre-enforcement context, the agency will normally prevail on a ripeness challenge. The agency succeeds 
when the issues can be framed to require further factual development, when the challenged act or omission seems 
interlocutory in nature, and when hardship of a denial of early review is difficult to show. From 1998 to 1999 the D.C. 
Circuit seemed particularly inclined  [*1129]  to dismiss cases for lack of ripeness. n138 This can be attributed to 
assorted causes. Claims might be becoming more “bold” than usual, prompting the court to more readily dismiss. n139 
It is possible that claims normally dismissed for lack of finality are slightly more convenient to dispense with under the 
finality component of the ripeness rubric. n140 But courts shy away from full exploration of the relationship of the 
ripeness doctrine to closely related statutes and doctrines. n141 
At least one federal appellate judge specializing in administrative law cases has begun to question this trend of 
agency victories on ripeness defenses. The “pendulum has swung too far in favor of permitting such review.” n142 The 
contexts and consequences of agency action are becoming increasingly complex n143 and courts are having difficulty 
absorbing the minutiae necessary for adequate contemplation of highly technical subjects, especially complex scientific 
matters. n144 Judge Randolph is “more than a little uncomfortable with [the ripeness doctrine], which imposes on 
courts the burden of deciding the validity of rules in the absence of a concrete factual setting.” n145 Courts have 
become more cautious as the “hard look doctrine” n146 has created incentives for  [*1130]  agency attorneys to craft 
more detailed briefs. n147 
It may be that the judiciary is simply trying to protect itself by ducking out of highly controversial issues at least 
until there seems to be sufficient public or political support for an opinion to carry the weight necessary for the ruling to 
survive attacks on stare decisis. Courts have used justiciability doctrines to take strides only when “the time was right, 
when acceptance could be anticipated.” n148 In contrast, when issues are subject to political deadlock and no clear 
support is to be found for judicial action, ripeness is used to keep the courts out of the fray. n149 Court watching can 
provide clues as to the balance of political power in other branches. 
During the Clinton Administration, Labor Secretary Robert Reich urged the President to strengthen regulations 
protecting traditional workers’ rights. In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, n150 the D.C. Circuit held illegal an 
executive order allowing the Secretary of Labor to disqualify companies from enjoying the benefits of federal 
contracting if they hired permanent labor replacements during strikes. On the issue of fitness for judicial consideration, 
the government argued that the lack of clear standards governing traditionally broad Secretary discretion militated 
against a finding of ripeness. The court disagreed, reasoning that the executive order had an immediate, adverse effect 
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on companies engaged in collective bargaining because the executive order made it less risky for workers to strike. As 
for hardship to the challenging party seeking pre-enforcement review, the court felt that losing the option of hiring 
permanent replacements constituted sufficient hardship to the employer, when measured against the increased assurance 
the order gave to labor. 
To increase the likelihood of a successful ripeness challenge, it is essential to lay out the issues thoroughly and 
adequately at trial, or at least on the first appeal. n151 In United Public Workers  [*1131]  of America v. Mitchell, n152 
the record was rendered unfit for judicial contemplation due to lack of specificity in allegations of unconstitutional 
Hatch Act restrictions. When considering fitness of issue for judicial review, the court must ensure there is a record 
adequate to support an informed decision when the case is heard. n153 While thoroughness is a virtue, overreaching is a 
vice. An example of overreaching is a “programmatic challenge” not focusing its attack on “an identifiable action or 
event.” n154 
VII 
The Dilemma of the Regulated Entity 
Failure to challenge the validity of rules and regulations prior to violation and subsequent enforcement actions 
imperils valuable interests held by potential plaintiffs. Prior to enactment of the APA, the Supreme Court recognized 
that an injury cognizable for judicial review could be created from the expectation of conformity with a regulation or 
rule. n155 A wry dissent in Poe v. Ullman put the matter succinctly: “Flout the law and go to prison?” n156 The factors 
encouraging courts to protect regulated entities by allowing early judicial review include the severity of the punishment 
for violation and the significance of any change, required by the new rule, from the status quo enjoyed by the entity 
prior to rulemaking. n157 
Today’s courts look to the Abbott Laboratories test and ask whether the regulated entity faces an “immediate and 
significant change” with significant penalties for non-compliance. n158 Abbott Laboratories showed the D.C. Circuit 
the wisdom of “a greater judicial willingness to aid litigants faced with the necessity of risking substantial harm in order 
to challenge the validity of governmental  [*1132]  action.” n159 Agency action is generally ripe for review when it 
forces a choice of enduring costly compliance measures or risking civil and criminal penalties. n160 
Statutory citizen suit provisions are beginning to encourage courts to accept pre-implementation review of 
regulations when citizens, rather than industry, challenge those regulations. “Corporate America has long had the right 
to sue federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act. Citizens, however, have had to stand on the sidelines, 
as the waters were fouled and forests were chopped down.” n161 The environmental protection movement continues to 
press judges to recognize that a healthy environment is a legally cognizable right. Progress here is slow. 
According to the Supreme Court, National Forest Management Plans do “not give anyone a legal right to cut trees” 
since “before the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site.” n162 This sounds odd when 
compared to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Appalachian Power that industrial polluters must comply with ‘interpretative 
rules’ laid down in a Guidance document, even though, before the EPA can do anything, the state must hold a permit 
hearing, review and respond to all industry complaints, and submit a particular permit to EPA for ultimate approval. 
n163 Environmental plaintiffs often face the same dilemma afflicting the regulated entity. n164 
Current court consideration of this dilemma tends to work to the benefit of big industry. n165 But there is an 
argument to be made for protecting the interest of acting in conformity with statutes otherwise subject to challenge. In 
NLRB Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, n166 these interests were underscored. Allowing procedural 
challenges to rules after the statute of limitations  [*1133]  for early review had lapsed would “waste administrative 
resources and unjustifiably impair the reliance interests of those who conformed their conduct to the contested 
regulation.” n167 Short statutes of limitation thus serve to help the regulated entity work with the agency, possibly 
gaining concessions and compromises, given the limited time during which to raise an expensive and compelling 
challenge. 
Another factor currently favoring regulated entities over groups of citizens suing to promote their interests and the 
general public interest in enforcement of laws is the Court’s current impatience with the “pattern or practice” suit. Such 
suits challenge agency actions that thread through multiple transactions, but that are not explicitly set out as identifiable 
“programs.” The Court’s ripeness jurisprudence has undercut the effectiveness of “pattern and practice” citizen suits. 
n168 In the context of NFMPs, this “brick wall” problem of challenging individual timber sales arguably creates a 
tangible, judicially cognizable injury by “allowing timber sales to go forward until a point is reached beyond which 
sustainability or species viability impairment can be demonstrated.” n169 This is the “tyranny of small decisions” which 
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can allow an agency to “implement in discrete steps a plan that would likely have been deemed arbitrary or capricious if 
reviewed as a whole.” n170 At present, the regulated entity enjoys ample protection from new regulations that might 
threaten their interests. The new Bush Administration’s solicitousness towards corporate and industrial interests bodes 
well for a continuation of this trend. 
VIII 
Ripeness Prior to the APA 
Prior to adoption of the APA, the ripeness doctrine was a “roller coaster” ride. n171 The pre-history of Abbott 
Laboratories features cases such as CBS v. United States, where Justice Stone announced that specific licensing 
“regulations have the force of  [*1134]  law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after.” n172 Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent in CBS was based on Justice Brandeis’ idea of the “finality” doctrine. n173 The general idea was 
to refuse to recognize a controversy when, upon further inspection, none existed. Others were involved in helping to 
establish the doctrine. The proposals and arguments raised by Professors Davis and Jaffe were instrumental in shaping 
the ripeness doctrine. The doctrine follows “a centiori from these precedents,” according to Justice Harlan. n174 
When enforcement action is not likely to occur, despite clear notice of violation, it is easy to find no hardship in the 
denial of pre-enforcement review. But in the case of Poe v. Ullman, one Justice, dissenting from the Court’s 
unwillingness to find ripeness in the dispute over Connecticut’s law banning contraceptive use, argued that a “sick wife, 
a concerned husband, a conscientious doctor seek a dignified, discrete, orderly answer to the critical problem 
confronting them ... . They are entitled to an answer to their predicament here and now.” n175 But Frankfurter’s 
plurality opinion in Poe “endures in its own right as a major ripeness precedent.” n176 
Perhaps the lesson of history is that ripeness considerations require judicial independence and ample discretion. 
“History will not provide final answers to the question of ‘when a court should intervene.’“ n177 Consistency and 
constancy are not always paramount virtues in law. Most laws and regulations are “in practice seriously undercut by a 
wide toleration of inconsistency in result and in meaning.” n178 The ripeness doctrine certainly displays such toleration. 
[*1135]   
Conclusion 
Ripeness thrives thirty-five years after its formal articulation in Abbott Laboratories, but its application remains 
shrouded in mystery. It is fairly certain that changes in the D.C. Circuit’s use of ripeness will not be radical. n179 It 
remains to be seen whether courts will continue to favor the regulated entity over those claiming environmental harm or 
hardship. With improved data, growing popular awareness, and an increase in the probative value of evidence of 
environmental, social, and other harms, the imbalance may be reduced somewhat, but some fear that “the distortion of 
both the ‘aggrieved’ requirement and Article III in environmental litigation will, if unchecked, greatly hamstring 
enforcement of laws aimed at safeguarding public health, not to say human survival.” n180 
Property interests and rights of both individuals and industries must continue to be weighed against the 
government’s need for efficiency in performing its duties on behalf of the public. Popular skepticism of the bureaucratic 
institutions of government continues to play into the hand of the party more comfortable navigating the labyrinthine 
corridors of power. n181 Recent victories by regulated entities against so-called “regulatory creep” do not ensure that 
the trend will endure. Federal courts still look less favorably on claims of individual plaintiffs than on defenses raised 
by federal agencies, when plaintiffs challenge manifestly legal agency acts or omissions. n182 
[*1136]  The Supreme Court will continue to lead the way in determining the scope of ripeness. n183 Government 
agencies and private litigants should, of course, closely scrutinize each sentence in the Court’s ripeness opinions. n184 
Despite the recent divisiveness in the ranks, n185 manifested in opinions such as Bush v. Gore, n186 the Court will 
remain a “flexible and non-dogmatic institution fully alive to such realities.” n187 With exclusive statutory jurisdiction 
to hear a host of different administrative matters, from the simple to the abstruse, federal courts will continue to use the 
slippery ripeness doctrine to justify decisions on the timeliness of litigation. n188 
By discouraging “abstract disagreements” with other branches of government, the doctrine provides legitimacy to 
and protects the power of the judiciary by prohibiting uninformed and unnecessary inter-branch conflicts. The ripeness 
doctrine is slippery, and its slipperiness both frustrates commentators and justifies judicial discretion: 
The categorization of a case as unripe for federal adjudication cannot be reduced to an altogether 
orderly, much less a highly principled and predictable, process. That realization cannot sit well with 
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anyone concerned to cabin the power of courts to duck controversy without candor. But it is unclear 
whether judicial discretion to engage in such avoidance of decision could be significantly constrained 
without unduly restricting  [*1137]  the flexibility needed to discharge the Article III function wisely. 
n189 
The doctrine also permits the judiciary a large measure of analytic flexibility in taking action, enabling life-tenured 
judges to produce opinions according to their own notions of appropriate timing, just as Paul Masson will “sell no wine 
before it is time,” according to Orson Welles. n190 Whether this salutary effect was intended by doctrinal design is 
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